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EPA In The Trump Era: The  
Superfund Enforcement Initiative 
By Donald Elliott February 21, 2018, 2:08 PM EST 
Since President Donald Trump took office just over one year ago, much has 
changed at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. In this Expert 
Analysis series, former EPA general counsels discuss some of the most 
significant developments and what they mean for the future of 
environmental law in the U.S. 
 
The popular narrative about the Trump administration and the environment 
has emphasized climate change, on which the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency under Administrator Scott Pruitt is undeniably less 
aggressive than under its immediate predecessor. One area that sharply 
conflicts with this pattern, however, is Superfund, where the Pruitt EPA is 
much more aggressive than all of its recent predecessors, especially when it 
comes to issuing unilateral administrative orders, or UAOs. Some speculate 
this may be to try to counteract the bad press it has received for being weak 
on the environment in other areas. 
The Comprehensive Environmental Remediation Compensation and  
Liability Act[1] aka “Superfund” was enacted in 1980 in the wake of the 
Love Canal incident when the media was all abuzz with stories about 
improper disposal of hazardous waste. The statute was amended in 1986, 
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and provides some of the strongest legal tools ever invented. The liability 
provisions in CERCLA §107 are particularly strong and make companies 
liable for the costs of cleaning up sites at which hazardous substances are 
released, or even “threatened” to be released, without fault or even causation 
if they fall into one of four categories: current owners, former owners at the 
time of disposal, arrangers for disposal, or transporters. This scheme is 
sometimes called “status liability,” because companies are liable without 
fault if they fall into one of the categories. 
Originally the statute was administered with a vengeance. Early on the EPA 
routinely required 30 years of pumping and treatment for groundwater even 
if it was technologically infeasible to return groundwater to its pristine state. 
The EPA also persuaded the lower courts to impose joint and several 
liability against deep pockets even if they did little or nothing to contribute 
to the actual problems at a site. When I left as EPA general counsel in 1991, 
we were estimating the total cost for cleaning up all the remaining  
Superfund sites we already knew about at the time was over $1 trillion (yes, 
with a T), or about one-seventh the total annual output of the U.S. economy 
as a whole. We knew that something had to change. 
The change began with the EPA’s "Unfinished Business" report in 1987, 
which assessed costs and benefits across EPA programs and showed that all 
of the other EPA programs produced much larger risk reductions at far 
lower costs than Superfund. Subsequently, all administrations, both 
Republican and Democrat, until President Donald Trump and Pruitt have 
gradually made Superfund implementation more reasonable. They 
understood that from a risk/benefit standpoint, “cleaning up” contaminated 
sites was very expensive but did relatively little to improve human health or 
the environment after the initial steps were taken to isolate the waste, 
stabilize the site and prevent exposure. 
Superfund gradually became more practical but less punitive and wasteful 
through a series of administrative interpretations, court decisions and 
statutory amendments that began under EPA Administrator William K. 
Reilly but continued under the Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama 
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administrations. For example, the agency started to pay more attention to 
cost-effective risk reduction than to cleanup for cleanup’s sake and stopped 
requiring continuing groundwater treatment where it was technologically 
infeasible to clean up groundwater. Congress added a defense for bona fide 
prospective purchasers of contaminated property in 2002. The U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected the EPA’s theory that parent companies were automatically 
liable for disposal by their subsidiaries in Bestfoods in 1998,[2] and it made 
divisions of liability more reasonable in its 2009 Burlington Northern case 
by interpreting Superfund to track traditional common law principles for 
apportioning liability.[3] 
By contrast, Pruitt has been a man on a mission when it comes to Superfund. 
In a July 25, 2017, memo to his inner circle of top political appointees and 
career staff, Pruitt wrote “the Superfund program is a cornerstone of the 
work that the EPA performs for citizens and communities across our 
country. My goal as Administrator is to restore the Superfund program to its 
rightful place at the center of the agency’s core mission.”  
Pruitt has taken over remedy selection personally at all sites costing over 
$50 million, something no other EPA administrator has ever done. He 
appointed Albert “Kell” Kelly, an Oklahoma banker, to head up a Superfund 
reform task force. With the aid of the EPA’s career staff, they have come up 
with an aggressive, but somewhat naive, policy to use lots of other people’s 
money and management principles derived from their business experience to 
“clean up” 21 high-priority sites as fast as possible, regardless of whether 
doing so actually creates benefits to the environment in excess of the costs. 
According to Pruitt’s memo, the new policy has “five overarching goals: 
expediting cleanup and remediation, reinvigorating cleanup and reuse efforts 
by potentially responsible parties [PRPs], encouraging private investment to 
facilitate cleanup and reuse, promoting redevelopment and community and 
revitalization, and engaging with partners and stakeholders.” To achieve 
these goals, Pruitt’s memo laid out 11 specific action steps, including using:  
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“enforcement authorities, including unilateral orders to recalcitrant 
PRPs, more actively in order to discourage protracted negotiations 
over response actions.” 
Perhaps this is the most controversial aspect of the Pruitt EPA’s Superfund 
enforcement initiative: the expanded use of unilateral administrative orders 
to a point that stretches the bounds of statutory and perhaps even 
constitutional limits. UAOs were intended by Congress to deal with 
relatively clear situations that pose an immediate “imminent and substantial 
endangerment” to public health, not merely situations in which the EPA has 
become frustrated by “protracted” delays in its own administrative 
processes. A UAO is an order issued without a hearing commanding a 
potentially responsible party to take immediate remedial or removal action 
to clean up a site under the threat of Draconian treble damages and daily 
penalties if they refuse to comply without sufficient cause. The EPA 
maintains that no judicial review is permitted of such orders, but rather one 
may only petition the government for reimbursement years later after the 
remedy is complete. 
Beginning in 2000, General Electric mounted a facial challenge to the  
CERCLA UAO process on due process grounds, losing in both the 
Washington, D.C., district court and the D.C. Circuit.[4] GE’s cert petition 
to the U.S. Supreme Court was denied in 2011 in the same term that the 
court granted cert instead in the Sackett v. EPA case involving UAOs under 
the Clean Water Act. In its Sackett opinion,[5] the Supreme Court avoided 
the constitutional due process issue by interpreting the statute to permit 
preenforcement review of the orders under the Clean Water Act. The courts 
may eventually interpret CERCLA as also permitting immediate judicial 
review of UAOs, as in Sackett, although that is more difficult to do because 
CERCLA §113(h) purports to limit judicial review of any order properly 
issued under Section 106(a), the section that authorizes UAOs. Thus, the 
courts may eventually have to face the constitutional issues that they ducked 
in Sackett. 
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If the EPA stays on its current course of using UAOs to direct private parties 
to implement final remedies that have been long-delayed but that don’t 
really present imminent and substantial threats to human health or the 
environment, they are likely to suffer setbacks in the courts that restrict the 
availability of the UAO tool,[6] which is useful in appropriate situations but 
can become abusive if misapplied. 
E. Donald Elliott is chairman of the environmental practice group at 
Covington & Burling LLP in Washington, D.C., and an adjunct professor of 
law at Yale Law School. He previously served as EPA general counsel. 
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under the Trump administration. 
The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
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or their respective affiliates. This article is for general information purposes 
and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice. 
[1] 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq. 
[2] United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
[3] Burlington Northern and Sante Fe Railway Co. v. United States, 556 
U.S. 599 (2009). 
[4] Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 327 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
[5] Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120 (2012). 
[6] The only purported authority for the EPA to issue UAOs without a 
finding of imminent and substantial endangerment is Pruitt’s memo, 
which is merely a guidance document. But the U.S. Department of 
Justice has recently emphasized that agencies cannot use guidance 
documents as the sole basis for civil enforcement. See Memo from the 
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Associate Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice Limiting Use of 
Agency Guidance Documents in Affirmative Civil Enforcement Cases, 
Jan., 25, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/file/1028756/download 
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